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This paper uses the longitudinal aspect of the Health and Retirement Survey to explore 
the characteristics associated with reversals in retirement (referred to here as 
“unretirement”).  Through the use of survival time analysis, this paper show that health 
insurance plays a significant role in unretirement decisions.  This role is underestimated 
when a static probit analysis is used alone.  The results hold up for a number of different 
retirement identifiers that are based both on self-reports of retirement and actual work 
levels.  The results are also robust to various definitions of retirement prompted by the 
difficult question of how to classify partial retirements.  The importance of health 
insurance provision in a retiree’s decision also remains significant when other “shocks” 
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 Most research in the area of retirement has focused on an individual’s decision to 
retire or continue working.  Debate in the field tends to focus on what model best fits 
retirement decision behavior.  What is often neglected is the fact that an individual’s 
working career does not always end with retirement.  Many retirees choose to return to 
work either on a part-time or full-time basis after fully retiring, or return to full-time work 
after partially retiring.  This paper examines which indicators are linked to the choice of 
retirees to go back to work after retiring, and specifically how much impact the lack of 
health insurance provision in retirement has on that decision.  The Health and Retirement 
Survey (HRS), produced by the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Michigan, provides a unique opportunity to study this question.  Due to the longitudinal 
nature of the survey, individuals can be followed and examined over a fourteen-year 
period.  After controlling for other potential characteristics that may be associated with 
leaving retirement, such as health changes and other “shocks,” indications that a 
respondent planned to work in retirement and demographic characteristics, this study will 
show using both simple probit and survival time models that the provision of health 
insurance has a dramatic effect on one’s decision to return to the work force or to 
increase the level of work that the retiree does.  For the purposes of this paper, retirees 
who choose to return to work will be termed “unretirees.”  Those who retire and do not 
return to work in the observation period will at times be referred to as “permanent 
retirees.”  A discussion of the appropriate definition of unretirement will follow in a 
subsequent section. 
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 The use of a survival time model has significant implications for our ability to get 
closer to the root causes of unretirement.  Previous studies have used stationary models to 
explain future unretirement behavior.  More specifically, researchers have used the 
characteristics of retirees at the time of retirement to predict behavior in the future.  This 
approach does not allow for changes to key indicators or for shocks.  This study will 
allow many indicators to vary with time during retirement in survival time models and 
compare the results to the static results produced from simple probit models.  In addition 
to indicators for the possession of health insurance and its source, time variant indicators 
of interest include health measures, the receipt of a pension, and changes to wealth, 
medical costs, and the retirement status of one’s spouse.   
 The next section of this paper describes recent trends in health insurance premium 
costs and employer provision of insurance as a retirement benefit.  Section III presents a 
summary of past work on retirement models and work on the importance of health 
insurance for labor force decisions.  Section IV discusses the various definitions and 
identifiers used for retirement and unretirement.   Section V describes the data used and 
sample restrictions.  Section VI discusses the characteristics of interest and raw 
differences between permanent retirees and future unretirees.  Section VII presents the 







II. Employer Provided Health Insurance and Industry Trends 
 
 The problem of health insurance coverage for early retirees1 has grown over 
recent years as fewer employers offer these benefits to their retirees while the cost of 
private insurance for older individuals is growing faster than health insurance premiums 
for other groups.  The risks associated with being uninsured are also increasing as 
medical care costs rise dramatically faster than inflation.  According to an Employees 
Benefits Research Institute report, the percent of early retirees in the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) receiving health insurance from their former employer 
has dropped from 39.2 percent in 1997 to 28.7 percent in 2002 (Fronstin, 2005).  A joint 
2006 survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Research and Education 
Trust found that the percentage of large firms (over 200 workers) that offered retiree 
health coverage fell from 66% in 1988 to 35% in 2006 (Kaiser, 2006).  Retirees are also 
able to continue their health insurance under the rules codified in the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (commonly referred to as COBRA benefits).  
COBRA allows all workers to continue their former benefits at 102 percent of the cost to 
the former employer for 18 months.  The Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
reported that the percent of large employers offering health insurance to retirees fell from 
between 60 and 70 percent in the 1980’s to 40 percent at the time of its report (GAO, 
1998).  Additionally, the report cited a Labor Department report that stated that 2 percent 
of 1994 retirees lost their promised retirement benefits in the following years.  Though 
this number is small, that report was issued at a time of economic expansion and 
                                                 
1 Here defined as those retiring before 65 when individuals become eligible for government-provided 
Medicare health benefits 
 5
anecdotal evidence more recently suggests that more firms are eliminating health 
insurance benefits to currently retired individuals. 
 Given that retirees do not qualify for Medicare coverage until they turn 65 unless 
they have a qualifying disability, early retirees without an employer provided health 
insurance option are left with the choice of finding an alternative source of health 
insurance or going without coverage.  Low cost alternatives include veteran’s benefits, 
trade union group policies and insurance provided through a spouse’s employer.  Another 
possibility is to find an individual policy with a private carrier, but this option tends to be 
extremely expensive and usually does not cover preexisting conditions.  A 1996 GAO 
study reported that individuals between the ages of 60 and 64 are two-and-one-half times 
more likely to be self-insured than people in their twenties.  The same study points to 
individuals between the ages of 60 and 64 as having the most expensive premiums, 
ranging from $210 to $532 per month in a survey of a few individual policy providers 
(GAO, 1996).  In another report, the GAO stated that a healthy 60 year-old man might 
pay close to four times the premium of a healthy 30 year-old man (GAO, 1999).    Those 
who can buy into their former employer-provided programs (through COBRA or special 
arrangement) benefit from lower premiums than they could get on their own, but the 
premiums for these plans are also quite expensive and rising dramatically.  The 
aforementioned 2006 Kaiser health benefits survey found that employer health insurance 
premiums averaged $4,242 per year for a single individual and $11,480 for a family plan 
in 2006.  This level of premiums represents an 87% increase from the premiums found in 
the same survey in 2000 (Kaiser, 2006).  
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III. Previous Work 
 The most prominent retirement models are based on a life-cycle consumption to 
leisure tradeoff and focus on the expected benefit of delaying retirement.  The models 
tend to differ in how they evaluate the expected benefit of delay.  One of the early models 
in this area, proposed by Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier, used previously 
established life-cycle utility maximization models and examined the expected impact of 
an additional year of work on expected utility (Gustman & Steinmeier, 1986).  James 
Stock and David Wise introduced a different approach that focused on the “option value” 
of remaining employed for one additional year.  In this model, Stock and Wise compared 
the expected present value of retiring today to the expected present value at all future 
ages, not just the following year (Stock and Wise, 1990).  A more complex version of the 
dynamic programming approach described above is a stochastic dynamic programming 
model, which compares the expected value of the maximum of future options compared 
to the current option value (Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999).  None of these models allow 
for the potential retiree to return to work, either planned or unplanned, following 
retirement.  One of the few dynamic programming models that allows for the possibility 
of unretirement was proposed by James Berkovec and Steven Stern (1991).  In their 
model, Berkovec and Stern allowed an individual in retirement to choose between 
remaining retired, working full-time, or working part-time.  In an attempt to simplify 
their complex model, the authors allowed for very little uncertainty in future wages and 
no uncertainty in the area of future health.  They also excluded the Social Security system 
entirely.  
 7
 The importance of health insurance coverage has been an area of interest in many 
empirical studies that analyze retirement decisions.  Many studies have found that the 
availability of health insurance benefits for early retirees encourages workers to leave the 
work force.  Similarly, the spike in the retirement hazard rate at the age of 65, when 
individuals become eligible for Medicare, is well documented.2    Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1994) used a number of 1970’s and 1980’s survey data to test the importance 
of current employer provided health insurance when applying their retirement model.  
They found that having current employer-provided insurance may delay retirement 
slightly, but that ignoring such benefits in retirement models only introduces slight bias.  
Lynn Karoly and Jeannette Rogowski (1994) used SIPP data from the mid to late 1980’s 
and a simple static model of retirement to show that employer-provided retiree health 
benefits contribute to a higher rate of retirement before the age of 65 (about 50 percent 
higher than those without such a benefit).  Jonathan Gruber and Brigitte Madrian (1995) 
used the Current Population Survey (CPS) and SIPP data to evaluate the impact of state 
mandated health insurance coverage after leaving an employer (similar to the later passed 
federal COBRA benefit guarantees).    They found that for men aged 55-64, a one-year 
continuation of health insurance raised the retirement hazard rate by 30 percent.  Using 
the 1992 through 1996 waves of the HRS, Rogowski and Karoly (2000) found that 
individuals with employer-provided retiree health insurance were 68 percent more likely 
to retiree than those without it.  Also using the HRS, David Blau and Donna Gilleskie 
(2001) found that employer provided retiree health insurance increased the likelihood that 
an individual retires by two to six percent for men from age 51 to 62, depending on how 
                                                 
2 Supported by the finding of Rust and Phelan [1997], though Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise [1992] and 
Madrian and Beaulieu [1998] have found contradictory evidence. 
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much of the cost is shared between the employer and the employee.  Richard Johnson, 
Amy Davidoff and Kevin Perese (2003) used the 1992 and 1994 waves of the HRS to 
show that full-time female and male workers between 51 and 61 years of age in 1992 
have a 26 percent and 31 percent higher retirement rate, respectively, if they have retiree 
health insurance.   Hugo Benitez-Silva and Frank Heiland (2003) also found that retiree 
health insurance increased the likelihood of early retirement using the first three waves of 
the HRS.  In addition, they found that having health insurance had a negative effect on 
the chances that a nonemployed (not just those declaring themselves to be retired) 
individual would return to work. 
 Work on unretirement is much more limited.  For the most part, estimates of the 
unretirement rate are left as a footnote to discussions of the retirement hazard rate.  
Christopher Ruhm (1990) found that over one quarter of retirees in the Retirement 
History Longitudinal Survey (RHLS) “reverse retire” and a similar number return to full 
work after partially retiring.  The RHLS followed a random sample of individuals aged 
58-63 in 1969 until the survey ended in 1979.  Of those who unretired from full 
retirement, Ruhm found that two-thirds moved to partial retirement and that over three-
quarters did so in the first four years of retirement.  He also found that those with 
pensions and higher levels of education were less likely to unretire than others when 
controlling for income, age, and gender.  Additionally, he found that married individuals 
were significantly more likely to reverse retire.  Health care costs and insurance provision 
were not addressed in Ruhm’s work. 
 In a more recent study using the first five waves of the HRS, Nicole Maestas 
(2004) focused on unretirement decisions.  She found that 24 percent of retirees in the 
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sample return to work within five years of retirement.  Additionally, individuals retiring 
at the ages of 51 or 52 unretired at a rate of 36 percent while only 16.7 percent of those 
retiring at 65 or 66 unretired.  The main conclusion of her work is that unretirement 
decisions were anticipated and not associated with poor planning or inadequate 
retirement resources.  In addition to a positive and significant coefficient on an HRS 
question in 1992 that asks if an individual plans to work in retirement, Maestas pointed 
out that eighty percent of future unretirees answered in the affirmative compared to only 
68 percent of those who did not plan on going back to work.   
  
IV.  Identifying and Defining Retirement and Unretirement 
 Retirement and unretirement are identified in a number of ways for this study, 
using two variables for designating retirement status.  The first reflects the self-reported 
retirement status of individuals who are asked whether they consider themselves to be 
“fully retired, partly retired, or not retired at all.”  The RAND dataset is the direct source 
of this data but it has taken these values almost directly from the HRS data.  A large 
portion of the values for this variable were coded as “Question Irrelevant.”  This response 
could be based on a prior response (such as work status) or because the respondent does 
not consider him or herself part of the labor force (if a homemaker or disabled, for 
example).  In the instances where the response is coded as “Question Irrelevant,” the 
respondent is assumed to continue to be retired if he or she was retired in the previous 
wave.  If the respondent was not retired in the previous wave and the next meaningful 
response (i.e. not missing or coded as irrelevant) is retired, the value is changed to 
correspond with any retirement date given elsewhere in the survey.  For example, if a 
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respondent self-reports not being retired in 1992 (wave 1), reports the question to be 
irrelevant in 1994 and 1996, and self-reports being “fully retired” in 1998 with a 
retirement date in the year 1995, the “question irrelevant” response in 1994 is changed to 
“not retired at all” and the 1996 value is converted to be the same as the 1998 value.  If 
this method fails to assign a value to the irrelevant response, it is given the value of the 
last non-irrelevant response.   
 The second variable that will be used to identify retirement is a RAND derived 
variable to represent labor force status.  RAND attempts to correct for discrepancies 
between respondents’ self-reports of retirement status and their work activity by using a 
number of survey questions.  By using variables that ask whether an individual is 
working for pay, is seeking work, and whether she considers herself retired (in addition to 
other variables), they have constructed a rubric to define an individual’s labor status.  
Specifically, if a person works full-time (considered to be 35 hours or more per week and 
at least 36 weeks per year), she is considered working regardless of her self-reported 
retirement status.  If respondents are not working full-time and mentions that they 
consider themselves retired, RAND determines their labor force status by their hours and 
weeks worked regardless of whether they considered themselves fully or partially retired.  
Respondents were only classified as fully retired if they reported partial or full retirement 
in one of two places in the survey (the self-reported retirement status question discussed 
above or in a separate labor force question) and did not work for pay.  If a respondent 
reported being fully or partially retired and either worked on a part-time basis3 or did not 
work for pay but reported looking for part-time work, RAND classified him or her as 
partially retired.  Other labor force statuses defined when retirement is not mentioned 
                                                 
3 Defined as working for pay but not meeting the hours or weeks requirement to be considered full-time. 
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include working part-time, unemployed, disabled, and not in the labor force.  Allowing 
people to be classified as unemployed, disabled, or not in the labor force adds some 
ambiguity to the dichotomy of retired versus working.  The first question is how to 
classify people who have a wave with an ambiguous labor force status between two 
waves where they are classified as retired.  For the purposes of this analysis, only 
changes in labor force status from a retired state to a working state will be considered 
unretirement.  A second issue to address is how to time the beginning of a retirement if a 
respondent transitions through one of these ambiguous labor force statuses between 
working and unretiring.  The timing of retirement in these cases does not affect whether 
one is classified as unretired at some point in the observed period since these transition 
periods cannot contain any reversals by definition.  But, this timing may affect whether 
one remains in the sample given the sample restrictions discussed in the next section.  To 
handle these transitions through an ambiguous state, respondents are assigned retirement 
states during these waves using a method similar to the one discussed above for “question 
irrelevant” responses to the self-reported retirement status question.  Retirement dates are 
used to determine whether to predate the retirement to the ambiguous response wave or to 
begin the retirement at the wave where full or partial retirement is reported as the 
respondents labor force status. 
 Table 1 shows how the retirement status of respondents based on the two 
identifying variables differ.  The stark majority of values agree with 88% of all retirement 
statuses for both variables being equivalent and 93.5% if missing values are excluded.  
There are almost equal numbers of responses where RAND considers a respondent more 
retired than his or her self-reported retirement status (e.g. fully-retired rather than 
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partially-retired or not retired) and cases where RAND downgraded an individual’s self-
reported status (e.g. working rather than partially- or fully-retired).  Most of these 
discrepancies are due to the number of hours and weeks worked by the respondent.  The 
cases where the respondent’s self-reported retirement status is not retired but his or her 
RAND labor force status is full or partial retirement are due to the fact that retirement can 
also be announced in a second question asking for all labor force statuses that apply.4  
The large number of missing values for the self-reported retirement question is 
predominantly due to the skip pattern of the HRS survey.  Most of these are eliminated 
from the sample due to reasons other than the fact that they have a missing value.5  These 
missing values are distributed relatively evenly across the waves of the study.  The bulk 
(about 95%) of those with missing self-reported retirement values appear to be working, 
but given the large number of people who consider themselves partially or fully retired 
despite their level of work, it seems inappropriate to assign these individuals a working 
status without knowing their underlying opinion about their retirement status.  
 When considering how to define unretirement, one must consider how to treat 
partial retirement.  Partial retirement could be considered a form of retirement in that it is 
the first step in the retirement progression where the worker reduces her hours in her 
career job, or more likely in another job.  Alternatively, one might consider partial 
retirement just another form of continuing one’s working life before she stops working 
entirely in full retirement.  Rather than chose one position, this study runs separate 
                                                 
4 I.e. Respondents have reported that they do not consider themselves retired in one question but then give 
“partially retired” or “fully retired” as a labor force status elsewhere in the survey.  RAND uses the same 
hours and weeks worked criteria for assigning labor force status in this case as discussed previously. 
5 The portion of the sample lost dropped from 6% of the whole universe of responses with missing self-
reports to 4% of the subset in either of the two primary samples, including the one based on the RAND 
labor force status. 
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analyses for each.  Where a response of partial retirement can identify the onset of 
retirement, a directional definition of unretirement is used.  A respondent would have to 
move from a higher to a lower state of retirement to be considered unretired.  The highest 
state of retirement for these purposes would be full retirement, followed by partial 
retirement and not retired (which would be the lowest state).  For example, if one is fully 
retired in the previous wave, she would be considered unretired if she moves to either a 
partially retired or not retired state, but only moving to a “not retired” state would be 
considered unretiring for a respondent who was previously partially retired.  Using full 
retirement alone to define retirement allows for a more straight-forward definition of 
unretirement.  In this case, any change from fully retired to partial retirement or not 
retired is considered unretirement.   
 
V. Data: 
 The “Initial” cohort of the Health and Retirement Survey tracks individuals 
between the ages of 51 and 61 in 1992, as well as their spouses, and records a wealth of 
data on income, employment, retirement, and health measures among many other things.  
The “War Baby” (WB) cohort was added to the HRS in 1998 and includes individuals 
born between 1942 and 1947 (and thus between 51 and 56 at the time they are first 
observed).  These individuals have been reinterviewed every two years since 1992 and 
1998, respectively, with the most recent available data from 2004.6  In an attempt to make 
the HRS data more accessible, the RAND Center for the Study of Aging has created data 
                                                 
6 Three additional cohorts of the HRS exist and have been excluded from this study.  Two of these cohorts 
are much older and would not be expected to have much labor force contribution (the “Ahead” cohort was 
born before 1923 and the “Children of the Depression” cohort between 1924 and 1930).  The third is a later 
cohort, the “Early Baby Boomer,” that was born between 1948 and 1953 and may have been interesting but 
was first surveyed in 2004 and thus only have one data point. 
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files with some variables cleaned to cut down on contradictory reports and to create 
compatible variables across waves since some survey questions changed from wave to 
wave.  It has also created a number of summary variables that are quite useful in this 
study.  With the exception of the data regarding health insurance coverage in this paper, 
most data values have come from the RAND dataset.  The health insurance and coverage 
data has come directly from the HRS raw files due to the more detailed information that 
those original files contain.   
 The Initial cohort covers the group of individuals that are between 51 and 73 over 
the fourteen years that they are followed for this survey and those in the War Baby cohort 
are between 51 and 62 over their eight years of coverage.  Spouses are included in the 
HRS surveys, but are only included as separate observations here if they would have been 
age-eligible for one of the two cohorts.   There are a few spouses in the Initial cohort who 
would have been age eligible for the War Baby cohort and vice versa.  These respondents 
have been retained in the sample if not omitted for some other reason.  The span of ages 
covered is consistent with the age range when individuals begin to consider both early 
retirement and traditional retirement.     
 Additional restrictions are put on HRS respondents in the Initial and War Baby 
cohorts to arrive at the sample used in this study’s analysis.  Because this study uses 
information from the time of retirement and controls for any duration bias, individuals are 
required to be observed and working in the first wave that their cohort is surveyed.7   In 
order to be included in the sample, an HRS respondent must be observed and have a non-
                                                 
7 Limiting the analysis sample to only those present in the sample at the cohort’s first wave eliminates those 
who might join the household after the initial contact.  There are some questions that are only asked at the 
baseline interview and would thus not be included for these individuals.  Also, they could not be observed 
for the full range of years if they were not present in the first wave. 
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missing value for her retirement status in every wave.  With this limitation, the question 
of what to do with missing values is avoided, but the question of selection bias is a valid 
concern.  Missing retirement values were discussed in the previous section.  Those 
respondents who are omitted from the sample for having non-responding waves can be 
separated into those who are deceased and those who attrite.  The deceased are no longer 
interesting to a paper focused on decisions about labor force participation since death 
severely does not allow for choices.  The reason for non-death attrition leaves much more 
cause for concern.   
 Table 2 shows any baseline8 interview demographic differences between those 
who attrite for reasons other than death and those that remain in the ultimate analysis 
sample.  When comparing means, their significance will be evaluated based on whether 
the hypothesis that the two means are equal can be rejected with a 95% level of 
confidence using a simple t-test.  There is not a statistically significant difference in age, 
marital status and the percentage working at their first observed wave between the two 
groups.  Those in the final sample are significantly more likely to be female and 
healthier, which could potentially be evidence of attrition due to unobserved death since 
men have a lower life expectancy and self-rated health is a proxy for actual health.9  
Racial, educational, and regional differences also exist between those remaining in the 
sample and those attriting.  Attriting respondents are more likely to be non-white or 
Hispanic, less educated, and from the North or Midwest.10  It is not clear what type of 
bias this may add to our results.  
                                                 
8 The baseline interview is 1992 for the Initial cohort and 1998 for the WB cohort. 
9 HRS surveyors have done their best to identify those who are deceased but cannot be certain in many 
cases of non-response. 
10 Probably lost due to a move to warmer climates. 
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 As Table 3 shows, the Initial HRS cohort consists of 13,367 individuals in 1992 
(over 7,600 households) and the WB cohort includes 2,694 respondents.  Eliminating 
from the sample those who are not age eligible for either cohort reduces the full sample 
by 15% with a higher rate of WB cohort individuals being ineligible than in the Initial 
HRS cohort.  Of those who are age eligible, about 12% die sometime during observation.  
The bulk of these are in the Initial cohort of the HRS which is not surprising given that 
they are followed for a longer period of time and are older when observed in 2004.  
Thirty percent are lost to attrition for reasons other than observed death, again primarily 
in the Initial cohort.  The requirement that respondents be working in the first wave of 
observation reduces the sample by an additional 25%. 
 Due to the fact that this study uses a number of definitions and identifying 
variables for retirement, the sample is slightly different for each.  The bottom section of 
Table 3 shows the differences in sample size for each specification.  Because the self-
reported retirement status variable has a larger number of missing variables (as discussed 
above), the requirement that there be no missing retirement values has a larger impact on 
the self-report sample (losing about 13% of the remaining sample) than the RAND 
derived labor force status sample (which has no missing values).  Finally, since this study 
focuses on the respondent’s decision to return to the work or increase his or her level of 
work, the samples are limited to only those observed to retire and given at least one wave 
of opportunity to be observed returning to work.  Using the directional, self-reported 
retirement definition discussed above, the sample shrinks by an additional 35% for those 
in the Initial cohort and almost 85% for those in the WB cohort due to their shorter period 
of observation and younger final age.  The full-retirement only definition reduces the 
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sample further since those who transition through partial retirement are not considered 
retired until they become fully retired, which delays the beginning of their retirement 
observation period.  Using the RAND labor force status definition creates similar 
reductions in the sample size under the directional definition (37% for the Initial cohort 
and 86% for the WB cohort).  The final samples range from 19% of the original sample 
(RAND labor force status identifier with directional definition of retirement) to 12% of 
the original sample (self-reported retirement using a full retirement only definition of 
retirement).  
 When focusing on decisions made solely during the traditional early retirement 
period (before respondents become eligible for Medicare), the sample only includes 
waves where the respondent is under 65 at the time of taking the HRS survey.  Again, in 
order for those in the sample to have at least one opportunity to unretire, the sample is 
restricted to those who are observed for at least one wave after their retirement while still 
less than 65 years of age.  Most of the additional reduction in the sample for those 
respondents less than 65 years of age is from the Initial HRS cohort since most of the WB 
cohort is under 65 for the full observation period.11  Final “under-65” samples range from 
7% of the full sample (self-reported, full retirement definition) to 12% (RAND labor 
force status, directional definition).      
 Table 4 shows the differences in the portion of the sample unretiring for the two 
retirement defining variables and the two unretirement definitions.  Though the 
unretirement portion for the full qualified sample12 is very similar between the self-
reported retirement and labor force variables with either unretirement definition (around 
                                                 
11 The exception being those spouses in the WB cohort who would have been age eligible for the Initial 
HRS cohort 
12 “Qualified” is discussed in the following section. 
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30% for the directional definition and 25% for the full retirement only definition), the 
below 65 years of age restriction introduces a three to four percent difference between the 
two retirement identifiers (27.4% for self-report and 23.3 for labor force status using the 
directional definition, 23.2% and 20.4% for the full-retirement only definition).  At first 
glance it may seem surprising that the subset of respondents retiring before their 65th 
birthday would have a lower unretirement portion than the full sample.  The reason for 
this counter-intuitive result is more a function of the sample restrictions than an 
underlying surprising fact. As will be discussed in the next section, the under-65 sample 
is restricted to waves where the respondent is under 65 so any unretirement after age 65 is 
not included.  The relationship across cohorts of the portion of the sample unretiring is 
generally as one would expect given the sample limitations.  The unretirement portion 
among those in the Initial HRS cohort closely resembles the full sample rates due to the 
fact that they make up most of the full sample.  The WB cohort shows slightly more 
variability but is relatively consistent with the full sample pattern.13  
 The range of unretirement portions found in the full sample, Initial HRS and WB 
cohorts (between 25% and 31%) are in line with similar statistics found in the few other 
studies focused on this topic.  Ruhm (1990) found that twenty-five percent of those 
observed over a certain minimum number of years reverse retired out of full retirement 
and a similar number reverse retired out of partial retirement (26 percent became not 
retired after partially retiring).  Maestas (2004) also found a similar figure of 24 percent 
                                                 
13 One might ask how the unretirement portion for the full retirement definition could be higher than the 
directional definition as it is for the War Baby cohort using the self-report identifier.  Though individuals 
moving from partial retirement to not retired are no longer counted in the numerator, they are also excluded 
from the denominator since they are not considered retired until they identify themselves as fully retired.  
In this case it appears that a higher percentage of “full” retirees increase their work level at a later wave 
than those who are only “partially retired”. 
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unretiring using data from the first five waves of the Initial HRS cohort.  She solely used 
the RAND labor force variable and a directional definition of unretirement.  
 
 
VI.  Comparing Those Who Unretire to Those Who Remain Retired: 
 Before moving into the formal analysis of the predictors of unretirement, it is 
worthwhile to explore the characteristics of those who decide to increase their work 
status.  Table 5 shows that there are many significant differences at the time of first 
retirements between those who go back to work after retiring and those who do not.  The 
table presents the mean values for key demographic characteristics for permanent retirees 
and future unretirees along with the t-statistic for the difference in the means between the 
two groups.  Future unretirees tend to be significantly14 younger (a little over a year 
difference for both retirement identifiers) than their permanent retiree counterparts at the 
time of their retirement.  Though there is not a significant difference between the 
percentage that are married and a significant difference only for the labor force identifier 
based on gender.  However, married males are significantly more likely to return to work 
than single males and women.  Respondents whose spouses are also retired when they 
retire are more likely to remain retired throughout our observation period than those 
without spouses or whose spouses are not retired.  As one might expect, individuals who 
rate their own health as “poor” or “fair” at their first observed retirement wave are 
significantly less likely to increase their working status than those who rate their health as 
“excellent,” “very good,” or “good,” but the self-rated health of a respondent’s spouse is 
not significantly different for the two groups.   
                                                 
14 Unless otherwise noted, significance is evaluated at the 95% confidence level. 
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 Major differences between the samples identified by the two retirement indicators 
are more common when looking at differences in race and educational attainment.  Race 
is a more significant outcome predictor for those whose retirement is defined by their 
self-reported retirement status rather than their RAND derived labor force status.  In the 
case of the self-reports, individuals identifying themselves as white tend to be less likely 
to unretire while those identifying themselves as of “other race” tend to be more likely to 
return to work.  None of the race indicators are significantly different under the labor 
force definition.  The opposite is true for the two indicators when looking at educational 
attainment.  Self-reported unretirement seems to have no significant link to attainment 
while the labor force defined unretirement is significantly less likely among people who 
do not finish high school than those that do.  Particular levels of educational attainment 
after high school are not significant indicators of future retirement behavior under either 
retirement identifier.  
 Table 6 compares characteristics of particular interest both across retirement 
identifier and across analysis method.  The probit analysis focuses on the value at a 
respondent’s retirement wave or, in the case of “shocks,” at the change in the value of a 
variable between the retirement wave and the following wave.  The survival time analysis 
uses the previous wave’s value of indicators and changes between the previous wave and 
the wave prior.   
 The health insurance provision and pension variables are almost uniformly 
different between permanent retirees and future unretirees.  Retirees who do not have any 
form of health insurance (including government-provided as well as through a spouse, 
former employer or trade union) are consistently more likely to return to work or increase 
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their work level than those who do have some form of health insurance, whether this is 
measured at retirement or in the wave prior.  The same is true among those who purchase 
their health insurance directly from a private insurer and thus do not have access to the 
reduced costs for health insurance associated with group policies.15  Purchasing health 
insurance through a current (for partial retirees) or former employer but paying the full 
cost is the only source of health insurance that does not appear to be significantly 
different for permanent retirees and future unretirees in all cases.   Though future 
unretirees are more likely to purchase insurance through an employer at retirement when 
retirement is identified using the RAND derived labor force status, the hypothesis that the 
two means are equal cannot be rejected with 95% confidence. If instead previous waves 
values are used, the same hypothesis can be rejected.  Whether the respondent receives a 
pension benefit in their retirement wave or in the previous wave is significantly different 
for permanent retirees and unretirees. 
 Table 6 also contains the difference in means of various “shocks.”  Here, shocks 
are changes in circumstances that may not be reflected in initial values at retirement.  Due 
to the different nature of the probit and survival time analyses, shocks are defined 
differently for each.  Since the survival time model allows for varying values across time, 
it is natural to define shocks as the change between the previous wave and the wave prior.  
For the probit analysis, this study instead focuses on the immediate shocks that may 
follow retirement by looking at changes between the values at the wave of retirement and 
the following wave (the first opportunity individuals have to unretire).  A shock to wealth 
is defined as losing 50% of one’s reported total wealth with a minimum change of at least 
                                                 
15 Such as those available to employers and trade unions 
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$10,000.16  When looking at a shock between the retirement wave and the following 
wave, future unretirees were significantly more likely to have had such a shock in every 
defined grouping except for the self-reported retirement definition.  The mean rate of 
reporting self-rated health declines of two levels or more17 is only significantly different 
between the two groups in the RAND derived labor force defined group with probit 
analysis shocks.  An increase in household size after retirement is significantly more 
prevalent for future unretireesunder both retirement identifier specifications.  An increase 
in out-of-pocket medical expenses of fifty percent or more and at least $2,000 does not 
appear to be significantly different for the two groups of retirees under any definition or 
analysis type.   
 Additional attention is paid in this study to a specific question in the Initial HRS 
wave that asked respondents whether they planned to do “paid work in retirement.”  
Though this does not directly refer to unretirement, since a transition through partial 
retirement would also seem to be included in this expectation, it has been the focus of 
previous work on the subject of unretirement and has proven to be quite powerful in 
predicting retirement status reversals (Maestas, 2004).  At least in comparison of means, 
this seems to hold true as future unretirees are significantly more likely to have reported 
plans to unretire when asked in the 1992 wave.18 
 
VII.  Analysis: 
                                                 
16 The amount of loss requirement is due to the fact that a loss of 50% of ones wealth is very different if a 
respondent begins with $1000 of wealth rather than $100,000. 
17 Self-rated health can be evaluated at one of 5 levels in the HRS: “excellent,” “very good,” “good,” “fair” 
or “poor”.  A two level drop would include going from excellent to good, fair or poor, from very good to 
fair or poor, or from good to poor. 
18 It is worth noting that this question was only asked in 1992, the initial wave, so is only available for those 
in the initial cohort.  Since this is the bulk of the sample, few observations are lost when it is used but the 
distribution of ages no longer includes the younger group represented by the War Baby cohort. 
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 The analysis in this study is done in parallel for probit and survival time (also 
commonly referred to as duration) methodologies.    The probit analysis is done to 
measure the significance of various characteristics at retirement in predicting future 
unretirement in any wave before the HRS survey ends.19 Because probit analysis does not 
have a time element, it cannot handle changes in the probability of unretirement related to 
the length of observation, often called duration bias.   Respondents are first observed as 
retired at different waves and thus have varying lengths of observation.  As a result, those 
who retire in the second wave of the HRS (the first possible time they could retire given 
the sample restrictions) have five opportunities to be observed as unretired while those 
who retire in wave six only have one wave where they may be observed as unretired.  In 
an attempt to reduce this bias, all probit analyses include “Wave retired” dummies as a 
way to capture differences in the “time at risk” of unretirement.  Additionally, the probit 
analysis does not account for censoring.  Those who have not unretired before they are 
censored are assumed to never unretire in this type of analysis. 
 The survival time analysis is designed to account for censoring (in this case from 
the end of survey) and account for varying lengths of observation and is also better 
equipped to evaluate the effects of shocks and other changes to a respondent’s 
maximization problem since the values can change with time.  This design element is one 
of the reasons why survival time models are commonly used in unemployment and 
welfare spell duration as many individuals do not become employed or get off welfare 
before the time of observation ends (if those events ever happens).  Because it is expected 
that respondents are less likely to unretire the longer they are retired, the survival time 
                                                 
19 This is the only form of censuring for this sample since all respondents with a missing wave are omitted 
from the sample.   
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specifications used in this study use a Weibull distribution in order to account for the 
expected negative duration dependence (Wooldridge, 2002).  More specifically, the 
hazard function (the likelihood that one will unretiree in a particular wave given one has 
not unretired in any of the previous waves) is not assumed to be constant over time and in 
fact becomes smaller the longer one has been retired.     
 Generally, values are evaluated at the first wave that retirement is reported for the 
probit analysis and measured at the previous wave for survival time analysis.  Previous 
wave values are used in the survival time analysis to avoid simultaneity bias for those 
who unretire since they are not observed just as they change their work status, but 1 day 
to 2 years after.  The previous wave values are the best look at what respondents’  
conditions were like at the time of unretirement.  Also, previous wave values are 
necessary in the case of benefits (such as health insurance and pensions) that may change 
because one returned to work rather than being responsible for it.  As discussed in the 
previous section, changes in characteristics, such as health or wealth, are measured on 
different ranges of time in the probit and survival time analyses.  In the probit case, 
characteristics are evaluated based on the change from the retirement wave to the wave 
following.  In the survival time analysis, changes are measured between the previous 
wave and the wave prior. Unfortunately, in the probit analysis this method leaves open 
the possibility of introducing some bias for those characteristics that may be affected by a 
return to work in the first wave after retirement.  For example, changes to wealth will be 
related to whether one returns to work in the first wave after retirement or not since they 
will be drawing an earned income if they are working.  Similarly, self-rated health may 
be affected by working.  In the case of financial changes, the bias should be in the 
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opposite direction of the expected significance,20 so any estimate should be a lower 
bound for the true value and thus a significantly positive result implies a larger significant 
positive result if it were not for the bias.  Similarly, for health shocks, it would be 
expected that those who experience sudden21 onsets of poor health are less likely to be 
able to return to work and thus less likely to unretire.  If returning to work makes 
individuals feel worse about their health due to the rigors of a working schedule and the 
stress related to working, respondents who unretire will be more likely to report drops in 
health in the wave they return to work, thus introducing bias in the positive (more likely 
to unretire) direction.  Therefore, the probit analysis value for this characteristic is an 
upper bound on the negative effects that may be associated with a negative health shock. 
 Probit analysis results are presented as the marginal impact on the probability of 
an event if all other values are evaluated at their means and there is either a one unit 
change if the variable is continuous or a change from zero to one if the variable is a 
binary value.  Survival time analysis results are presented as a hazard ratio.  The 
numerator of the ratio is the value of the hazard if an observation has the associated 
characteristic and the denominator is the value of the hazard if that characteristic is not 
present if the value is binary.  If the value is instead continuously valued, the ratio is that 
of the hazard with and without single unit changes around the mean.  Characteristics have 
a positive impact on the hazard rate if the hazard ratio has a value greater than one and a 
negative impact if the ratio is less than one.  Though these two measures may not be 
directly comparable, the marginal impact can be converted to a naïve probability ratio.  
                                                 
20 For example, if an individual lost over 50% of his or her wealth, and returned to work, the positive 
income earned could increase his or her wealth so that by the time they are observed, they no longer appear 
to have lost 50% of their wealth and the unretirement will not be associated with this variable.  
21 Here, “sudden” means within a two-year period due to the restrictions of the HRS survey’s frequency. 
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This estimate can be reached by taking the overall probability of unretiring for the 
appropriate unretirement definition and retirement identifier from Table 4, adding or 
subtracting the value of the appropriate coefficient (depending on the sign of the 
coefficient), and then dividing by the overall probability.     
 Table 7 presents the association of demographic, health and wealth characteristics 
with future unretirement under both types of analysis, both retirement identifiers and both 
unretirement definitions for the full sample.  Table 8 shows the results of the same 
analyses for those under the age of 65 only.   Very few respondent characteristics had 
across the board significance in the full sample.  The exceptions were those retirees who 
had coordinated retirements with their spouses22 and females with self-reported poor 
health (defined previously).23  In both cases, having that characteristic significantly 
reduces the likelihood that one will increase his or her level of work regardless of the 
retirement identifier, the analysis method, the unretirement definition or sample 
restrictions based on age.  The age of the respondent when first identified as retired tends 
to have a negative impact (as one would expect) on unretirement but it is not significant 
in many cases for the full sample.  In the under-65 sample, the results are even more 
surprising.  Though the age of the respondent at the retirement wave is significant for 
every specification, the sign of the impact is negative in probit analyses but positive in 
survival time analyses.  The reason for this counter-intuitive finding in the survival time 
analysis is not clear. 
                                                 
22 For the purposes of this study, “coordinated retirement” means that the respondents spouse is also retired 
at the time or interest (at retirement or in the previous wave depending on the analysis type), not that the 
couple retired at the same time. 
23 Men with self-rated poor health did not have a significantly lower rate of unretirement and, in fact, in 
some cases this characteristic is associated with a higher rate of reverse retiring when using the RAND 
labor force identifier.  
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 Gender and marital characteristics do not have consistent significance across 
specifications.  For these characteristics, the excluded group is single females.  Being a 
single male is associated with a lower unretirement rate (significantly for the under-65 
sample) while married men have significantly higher unretirement probabilities and 
hazard ratios when using a self-reported retirement identifier, but the impacts are 
generally not significant with the RAND labor force status identifier.  Married females do 
not have significantly different outcomes than their single counterparts in most analyses’ 
specifications with the exception of some probit specifications with a full retirement only 
definition.  Those respondents whose spouse self-rates his or her health as poor or fair 
tend to not have significantly different influence on unretirement when using a directional 
definition of unretirement.  For the full-retirement only definition of retirement, spouse’s 
health has a significantly positive value for female respondents and a significantly 
negative effect on unretirement for males when using either retirement indicator in the 
probit analysis for the full sample.  This significance is not present in the results for either 
gender in the survival time analysis.  For respondents under 65 years of age, the values 
show the same coefficient sign pattern but are only significant for the self-reported 
retirement indicator and the “full-retirement only” definition of unretirement when using 
a probit analysis. 
 Race, region and educational attainment show limited relationships to future 
unretirement in this analysis.  For the full sample, identifying oneself as black indicates a 
significantly higher likelihood of unretiring for all specifications other than those based 
on the RAND derived labor force status.  This significant difference is not present in the 
under-65 sample except in one survival time specification.  Being of “other race” or self-
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identifying as Hispanic leads to no significant differences from those identifying 
themselves as white in almost all cases.  Surprisingly, educational attainment does not 
appear to play a significant role in post retirement changes in work level.  In some 
specifications using the labor force status retirement indicator, those who have not 
attained at least a high school diploma are significantly more likely to unretire than those 
with a high school diploma for the full sample but are not significant for the under-65 
sample.  Attaining education above a high school diploma does not make a significant 
difference in unretirement rates in any specification on either sample.  Regional 
differences are also minimal.  Being from the Midwest Census Region appears to be the 
only region that is consistently significantly different from the South Region though only 
for survival time analyses.     
 In the following discussion and tables focusing on other respondent 
characteristics, the results for demographic, health, and wealth variables are suppressed 
though the tables indicate whether they have been included or not.  With only a few 
exceptions, the significance and sign of the coefficients do not change with additional 
variables.   
 Tables 9 and 10 show the results following the introduction of the health 
insurance characteristics, which are of the most interest in this study.  A control for 
whether a respondent receives a pension is also added.24  As discussed previously, this 
study separates respondents into four health insurance categories based on their source, if 
any, for coverage.  Provision from a previous or current employer, a trade union, a 
                                                 
24 Not surprisingly, receiving a pension payment at retirement or in the previous wave had a negative 
impact on unretirement probabilities and hazard ratio where significant different from zero with 95% 
confidence.  It was significant in about half of the specifications under either the probit or survival time 
methodology. 
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spouse’s employer, or through a government program where the respondent does not pay 
the full cost is used as the control group.  The non-control groups are those without any 
health insurance, those who purchase their health insurance directly from a private 
provider, and those who have current or former employer-provided health insurance but 
pay the full cost (i.e. it is not subsidized by the employer).   The results for those without 
any form of health insurance are stark.  In the probit analyses, the marginal impact on the 
probability of unretiring (evaluated at the mean) associated with changing from having 
subsidized health insurance at retirement to having no health insurance at retirement 
ranges from 8% to 13% in the full sample and from 8% to 17% in the over-65 sample and 
is everywhere significant.25  The results are even stronger when using a survival time 
analysis.  Individuals without health insurance in the previous wave are consistently 
twice as likely to unretire as those with subsidized insurance (everywhere significant at 
the 1% level for all specifications and both samples).  Though the results under both the 
probit and the survival time analysis are strongly positive, the dramatically larger 
magnitudes of the survival time hazard ratios than the naïvely derived probability ratios26 
show the significant underestimation of the importance of having some form of health 
insurance when limiting an analysis to only characteristics at the retirement wave.    
    The same kind of strong results are not seen when considering the purchase of 
private insurance.  Those who purchase their own health insurance through a private 
provider do not have a significantly higher probability of unretiring or hazard rate than 
                                                 
25 With the exception of the specification that uses the labor force indicator and does not control for 
demographic characteristics  
26 Values of the naïve probability ratio range from 1.3 to 1.7. 
 30
those who have subsidized health insurance in almost all specifications.27  The likely 
reason for this is that two very different groups purchase the very costly private insurance 
and they have dramatically different unretirement tendencies.  One group would be those 
who can easily afford private insurance and are very unlikely to unretire.  The second 
group is those who are either very risk averse or are at high risk of accruing high medical 
bills and thus are not willing to go without insurance.  Respondents in this group are 
more likely to unretire either to qualify for employer-provided health insurance or to earn 
extra income to afford their high premiums. 
 The case of full cost employer provided health insurance further exemplifies the 
advantages of the survival time model over a simple probit analysis.  When looking at the 
probit specifications, the results for this indicator are almost everywhere insignificant.  
Conversely, the hazard ratios from the survival time analysis are almost everywhere 
significant and show 70% increases in the hazard rate when receiving unsubsidized 
employer provided health insurance compared to those receiving subsidized insurance in 
the full sample.  In the under-65 sample, increases in the hazard ratios are lower for all 
specifications, averaging around 40%, and the ratio is insignificant for the specification 
identified by self-reports of retirement with unretirement defined by the full-retirement 
only definition.   
 In Tables 11 and 12, a number of “shocks” are introduced.  “Shock” is something 
of a misnomer as some of these occurances may be anticipated (such as decreases in 
wealth or increase in household size) but may also be surprises to the respondent.  It is 
assumed that changes to health and medical expenses are not anticipated.  As discussed 
                                                 
27 The exceptions being the probit analyses using the self-reported retirement indicator and a full-retirement 
only definition for the full sample 
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previously, shocks in the probit analysis represent changes from the retirement wave to 
the following wave and in the survival time analysis as changes from the previous wave 
and the wave prior.  The addition of these shocks in the specifications had no impact on 
the sign and significance of almost all of our health insurance indicators discussed above.   
 Dramatic changes in wealth28 are associated with increases in the probability of 
unretiring in probit analyses for both the full and under-65 samples.  Specifically, wealth 
shocks are significant for the RAND derived labor force status identified retirement 
specifications but not those identified by self-reported retirement status.  Under a survival 
time specification with the full sample, wealth drops have everywhere significantly 
positive associations to unretirement with magnitudes ranging from 20% to 34% higher 
hazard rates when this shock occurs.  The results are similar in magnitude for the under-
65 sample but the significance level declines in the self-reported retirement identified 
specifications because of larger standard errors (due to the smaller samples).  These 
results hold true whether wealth at retirement is controlled for or not.  Declines in health 
do not have any significant impact on unretirement probabilities and hazard rates even 
when self-reported poor health are not controlled for.  The exception is for the full sample 
when retirement is identified by the labor force status value and changes are evaluated 
between the retirement wave and the following wave.  In this case, health shocks are 
associated with significantly negative effects on unretirement probabilities.  Similarly, 
increases in out-of-pocket medical expenses of fifty percent or more and at least $2,000 
(inflation adjusted) are not associated with changes in unretirement rates in almost all 
                                                 
28 Here defined as a drop in inflation adjusted wealth of at least fifty percent between waves that is at least 
$10,000 
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specifications.29  Increases in household size are only associated with increased 
unretirement rates when using probit analyses while the same change in the previous 
wave are not significant under any specification of the survival time analyses.     
 In the final tables, Tables 13 and 14, this study addresses the previous work on 
expectations through the HRS survey question asking respondents whether they “plan to 
do paid work in retirement” and look at how the inclusion of this control affects the 
significance of insurance sources on unretirement.  Because this question was only asked 
in the first HRS wave in 1992, the sample is limited to the Initial HRS cohort only.  The 
expectation of working in retirement has a significant and sizeable impact on both the 
probability and hazard rate of unretirement under all specifications and both the full 
Initial HRS cohort and the under-65 sub-sample.  The marginal impact on the probability 
of unretiring is between 10% and 12% for the Initial HRS cohort and between 6% and 
8% for the under-65 sample.  The hazard ratio for this expectation ranged from 1.4 to 1.9 
over both samples.   
 The addition of the future employment expectations to this study’s analyses has a 
small impact on the previously discussed health insurance characteristics.  For those who 
do not have any form of health insurance, the size of the marginal impacts and hazard 
ratios are uniformly reduced but only fail to continue to be significant in the probit 
analyses where the full-retirement definition of unretirement was used.  There is no 
change in the across the board insignificance for those who purchase their own private 
insurance.  Unsubsidized employer provided health insurance continues to have an 
insignificant impact on unretirement rates when a probit analysis is done.  The 
                                                 
29 It should be noted that the health insurance sources are controlled for and therefore the variability of 
expenses may be related to that source and whether one has insurance at all. 
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significance for the survival time analysis of this source of health insurance does not 
change when retirement work expecations are included and even has many hazard ratios 
increase in magnitude.30   
 Like earlier tables, Table X highlights the differences in the relative significance 
of some variables between the static probit analysis and the time-variant survival time 
analysis.  If one where to solely look at the probit results with the full Initial HRS cohort, 
the respondent’s expectation of working in retirement would appear to be consistently 
more important than having health insurance for the decision to unretire.  When 
respondents’ health insurance access is allowed to vary with time for the full sample in 
the survival time analysis, this relationship is reversed.  When looking at the results for 
the full-sample, both having no insurance and having unsubsidized employer provided 
health insurance have larger hazard ratios than that for the work expectation in all cases 
except the case where the labor force status is used to define retirement with a full 
retirement only definition of unretirement.  This analysis comparison does not hold true 
when restricting our sample to only those younger than 65 years of age.  In that case, the 
marginal probability changes for those with no health insurance are dramatically larger 
than the margin probability changes for expecting to work in retirement (though the 
significance of the prior is not consistent).  This relationship is logical since those who 
are not old enough to qualify for Medicare should be most influenced by insurance 
considerations.    
 
VIII.  Conclusion: 
                                                 
30 The hazard ratio of those with unsubsidized employer provided health insurance to those with subsidized 
health insurance continues to be insignificant when a full retirement only definition of unretirement for 
those in the under-65 subsample when using a survival time analysis. 
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 Through the use of survival time analysis, this paper has shown that health 
insurance plays a significant role in unretirement decisions.  This role is underestimated 
when a static probit analysis is used alone.  The results hold up for a number of different 
retirement identifiers that are based both on self-reports of retirement and actual work 
levels.  The results are also robust to various definitions of retirement prompted by the 
difficult question of how to classify partial retirements.  The importance of health 
insurance provision in a retiree’s decision also remains significant when other “shocks” 
and the prospect of planned unretirement are introduced.  
 This study supports the finding of past studies that a significant number of retirees 
return to work after a period of retirement, irregardless of how one defines retirement.  
As such, more work needs to be done to refine previous retirement models so that they 
can account for the real choice that retirees make to return to work or develop new 
models that can explain this phenomenon.  Any model will need to include both the 
motivations behind anticipating a future return to work and the role that health insurance 
plays in labor force decisions.  The latter has been examined previously in regard to 
leaving the work force and this study has shown its significance in choices to leave full or 
partial retirement.   One policy extension for such a model would be the effects of 
legislation to offer 62 year-olds the ability to buy into Medicare (which they do not 
currently have).  The implications of this type of extension of benefits have been studied 
in the context of the choice to retire, but not in the area of a retiree’s decision to return to 




Benitez-Silva, Hugo and Frank Heiland (2003), “Micro Determinants of Labor Force 
Status among Older Americans,” Stony Brook, NY: State University of New York at 
Stony Brook. 
 
Berkovec, James and Steven Stern (1991), “Job exit behavior of older men”, 
Econometrica 59(1): 189-210. 
 
Blau, David and Donna Gilleskie (2001), “Retiree Health Insurance and the Labor Force 
Behavior of Older Men in the 1990s”, Review of Economics and Statistics 83(1): 64-80. 
 
Fronstin, Paul (2005), “The impact of the erosion of retiree health benefits on workers 
and retirees”,  http://www.ebri.org/ibpdfs/0305ib.pdf. 
 
General Accounting Office (1996), “Private Health Insurance: Millions Relying on 
Individual Market Face Cost and Coverage Tradeoffs”, Report to the Committee on 
Labor and Human Resources, U.S. Senate, November 1996. 
 
General Accounting Office (1998), “Private Health Insurance: Declining Employer 
Coverage May Affect Access for 55- to 64-year-olds”, GAO/HEHS-98-133. 
 
General Accounting Office (1999), “Private Health Insurance: Progress and Challenges 
in Implementing 1995 Federal Standards”, GAO/HEHS- 99-100. 
 
Gruber, Jonathan and Brigitte Madrian (1995), “Health Insurance Availability and the 
Retirement Decision”, American Economic Review 85(4): 938-48. 
 
Gustman, Alan and Thomas Steinmeier (1986), “A Structural Retirement Model”, 
Econometrica 54 (3): 555-584.   
 
Gustman, Alan and Thomas Steinmeier (1994), “Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
and Retirement Behavior”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 48(1):124-40. 
 
Hogg, Robert and Allen Craig (1995), Introduction to Statistical Inference 5th Edition, 
Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
 
Johnson, Richard W, Amy Davidoff, and Kevin Perese (2003), “Health Insurance Costs 
and Early Retirement Decisions”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56: 716. 
 
Karoly, Lynn and Jeannette Rogowski (1994), “The Effect of Access to Post-Retirement 




Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Education Trust (2006), “Employer 
Health Benefits: 2006 Annual Survey Summary of Findings”, 
www.kff.org/insurance/7527/index.cfm. 
 
Lumsdaine, Robin and Olivia Mitchell (1999), “New Developments in the Economic 
Analysis of Retirement”, Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Eds. O. Ashenfelter and 
D. Card: 3261-3307. 
 
Lumsdaine, Robin, James Stock and David Wise (1992), “Pension Plan Provisions and 
Retirement: Men and Women, Medicare and Models”, NBER Working Paper No. 4201. 
 
Madrian, Brigitte and Nancy Beaulieu (1998), “Does Medicare Eligibility Affect 
Retirement?” Inquiries in the Economics of Aging, Ed. David Wise. Chicago University 
Press: 109-131. 
 
Maestas, Nicole (2004), “Back to Work: Expectations and Realizations of Work after 
Retirement” RAND Working Paper. 
 
Rogowski, Jeannette and Lynn Karoly (2000), “Health Insurance and Retirement 
Behavior: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey”, Journal of Health 
Economics 19(4): 529-39. 
 
Ruhm, Christopher (1990), “Bridge Jobs and Partial Retirement,” Journal of Labor 
Economics 8(4): 482-501. 
 
Rust, John and Christopher Phelan (1997), “How Social Security and Medicare Affect 
Retirement Behavior in a World of Incomplete Markets”, Econometrica 65(4): 781-831. 
 
Stock, James and David Wise (1990), “Pensions, the option value of work and 
retirement”, Econometrica 58 (5):  1151-1180. 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Table 1 :  Retirement Reports as Defined by the Two Primary Variables
Cells contain the number of reports for each pair of responses






Not Retired 27,210 284 110 28
Full Retirement 89 8,510 497 0
Partial Retirement 708 993 2,620 0
Missing 2,209 333 73 33
Rand Derived Labor Force Status
Table 2: Identifying Potential Sample Selection Bias
Evaluated at the First 




in at least 
One Wave (1) t-value (2)
Number of Respondents 8346 3111
Age in Years 54.25 54.32 0.91
Male 42.8% 45.3% 2.42
Married 79.7% 78.4% 1.53
Currently Working 73.8% 72.1% 1.81
Self-rated Health (1-excellent, 
5-poor) 2.43 2.54 4.71
R Reports Being White 82.0% 76.0% 7.23
R Reports Being "Other Race" 14.5% 18.9% 5.66
R Reports Being Black 3.4% 5.1% 4.19
R Reports Being Hispanic 7.8% 12.4% 7.74
R from North Census Division 16.9% 18.9% 2.45
R from South Census Region 25.7% 22.0% 4.07
R from Midwest Census 
Division 40.7% 44.5% 3.60
R from West Census Division 16.6% 14.6% 2.63
R has less than High School 
Diploma or GED 20.9% 27.3% 7.37
R has High School Diploma 37.6% 37.1% 0.51
R has Some College but No 
Degree 21.0% 20.0% 1.18
R has College Degree or More 20.5% 15.6% 5.98
(1) Included are age eligible, active in the first eligible wave for their cohort and not 
observed as dying in any wave
(2) The hypothesis that the two means are equal can be rejected with 95% confidence if 
the t-value is over 1.96 
Table 3: Sample Restrictions and the Size of the Final Samples
Cells contain the number of Respondents remaining in the sample after each restriction
Initial HRS
War 
Babies Total Initial HRS
War 
Babies Total
HRS respondents 13367 2694 16061 13367 2694 16061
Age Eligible for either cohort: Born 
between 1931 and 1947 (1) 11459 2121 13580 11459 2121 13580
Alive in all Survey Years 9953 2048 12001 9953 2048 12001
Observed in all 7 waves for Initial HRS 
or all 4 waves for War Babies 6703 1643 8346 6703 1643 8346
Working in First Observed Wave 4531 1232 5763 4531 1232 5763
Must not have missing retirement 
variables 3944 1065 5009 4531 1232 5763
Observed for at least 1 Wave Post-
Retirement (Directional Definition) 2577 168 2745 2856 174 3030
Observed for at least 1 Wave Post-
Retirement while under 65 (Directional 
Definition)
1590 165 1755 1715 169 1884
Observed for at least 1 Wave Post-
Retirement (Full Retirement Only 
Definition)
1906 87 1993 2313 123 2436
Observed for at least 1 Wave Post-
Retirement while under 65 (Full 
Retirement Only Definition)
1034 86 1120 1298 119 1417
Self-reported Retirement Status Rand Labor Force Status 
(1) 1931 to 1941 for Initial cohort and 1942 to 1947 for WB
Retirement Definition Specific Final Samples:











Full-Sample (1) 30.6% 25.1% 29.4% 25.0%
Under-65 27.4% 23.2% 23.3% 20.4%
Original HRS 30.8% 25.0% 29.6% 25.0%
War Babies 26.8% 27.6% 27.0% 25.2%
Self-reported Retirement 
Rand Labor Force 
StatusPortion of the 
Sample ever 
Unretiring
(1) Individuals in all samples are observed for at least one wave following retirement
Table 5: Differences in Means for Demographic, Health, and Wealth Characteristics










Age in Years 61.13 60.03 7.15 61.20 60.43 5.11
Male 43.8% 47.3% 1.73 46.0% 50.4% 2.18
Married or "Partnered", 
includes Absent Spouse 74.9% 75.3% 0.23 76.2% 77.6% 0.83
Married and Male 36.2% 41.2% 2.47 39.3% 43.5% 2.17
R & SP retired at R's 
Retirement Wave 39.2% 32.1% 3.6 39.3% 35.2% 2.08
Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' 
Health 22.2% 15.9% 3.79 24.0% 15.3% 5.39
Spouse Self-rated 'Poor' or 
'Fair' Health 13.3% 14.2% 0.62 15.1% 13.8% 0.93
Total Wealth (in 100,000s) 
in 2000 $'s 3.93 3.58 1.23 3.71 4.07 1.34
R Reports Being White 84.5% 80.8% 2.37 82.8% 82.4% 0.25
R Reports Being "Other 
Race" 2.0% 3.3% 2.02 2.6% 2.7% 0.19
R Reports Being Black 13.5% 15.9% 1.64 14.7% 14.9% 0.17
R Reports Being Hispanic 5.2% 6.4% 1.25 6.1% 5.8% 0.25
R has less than High 
School Diploma or GED 17.3% 17.6% 0.24 20.3% 15.9% 2.78
R has High School Diploma 39.8% 38.7% 0.54 39.2% 39.7% 0.28
R has Some College but No 
Degree 20.7% 21.2% 0.32 20.2% 21.9% 1.02
R has College Degree or 
More 22.2% 22.4% 0.93 20.3% 22.4% 1.33




Rand Labor Force Status
Directional Definition
Full Sample



















Respondent (R) Has No Health Insurance 8.3% 11.8% 2.86 5.4% 10.0% 5.22 8.8% 12.3% 3.00 5.8% 9.6% 4.27
R Buys Private Health Insurance 7.8% 11.1% 2.83 6.5% 10.8% 4.54 7.6% 10.8% 2.88 6.3% 9.9% 3.98
Employer Provided Health Insurance but R Pays 
Full Cost (Unsubsidized) 21.2% 24.9% 2.15 15.1% 22.6% 5.45 20.8% 23.7% 1.78 14.8% 21.4% 5.06
R Receives Pension 36.1% 31.3% 2.41 42.4% 37.8% 2.5 36.6% 32.8% 1.99 42.5% 36.5% 3.37
Total Wealth Drops more than 50% & more than 
$10000 between Waves 10.7% 12.8% 1.6 10.3% 13.7% 3.01 10.7% 14.1% 2.68 10.7% 13.7% 2.66
R's Health Declines by 2 Levels or more between 
Waves 3.3% 3.9% 0.89 4.8% 3.9% 1.06 4.1% 2.5% 2.21 5.4% 4.0% 1.69
R's Household Size Increases between Waves 7.9% 11.2% 2.78 8.5% 8.6% 0.12 8.1% 10.8% 2.37 8.4% 9.0% 0.59
Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses increase by more 
than 50% & over $2,000 between Waves 15.7% 13.6% 1.42 15.2% 13.9% 0.97 15.9% 14.3% 1.14 15.3% 16.3% 0.77
Respondent Plans to do Paid Work in Retirement 
(asked in Wave 1 only) 70.0% 79.0% 4.68 69.2% 79.0% 5.57 69.5% 80.6% 5.86 68.4% 80.6% 6.97
Previous Wave Value or the 
Change between the Previous 
Wave and the One Prior
Rand Labor Force Status
Directional Definition
(1) The hypothesis that the two means are equal can be rejected with 95% confidence if the t-value is over 1.96 
At Retirement or the Change 
between Retirement Wave and 
the Next
Previous Wave Value or the 
Change between the Previous 
Wave and the One Prior
Self-reported Retirement Status
Directional Definition
At Retirement or the Change 
between Retirement Wave and 
the Next
Table 7:  Probit and Survival Analysis of Unretirement Using Demographic and Health Controls























-0.013** 0.971** -0.007** 0.998 -0.007* 1.003 -0.005 1.005
[0.003] [0.010] [0.002] [0.011] [0.003] [0.015] [0.003] [0.013]
-0.084* 0.727 -0.016 0.96 -0.077 0.668 -0.014 0.869
[0.041] [0.127] [0.040] [0.159] [0.044] [0.152] [0.041] [0.173]
-0.047 1.106 -0.006 1.235 -0.070* 0.9 -0.013 1.024
[0.032] [0.130] [0.030] [0.150] [0.035] [0.131] [0.031] [0.145]
0.148** 1.554* 0.05 1.197 0.154** 1.966** 0.065 1.543
[0.049] [0.305] [0.045] [0.224] [0.054] [0.505] [0.047] [0.347]
-0.065** -0.048* -0.075** -0.072**
[0.021] [0.020] [0.023] [0.020]
0.521** 0.553** 0.583** 0.544**
[0.044] [0.044] [0.065] [0.055]
-0.001 0.996 0.001 1.004 0.000 1.000 0.001 1.012
[0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.005] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002] [0.008]
-0.148** -0.166** -0.145** -0.164**
[0.026] [0.025] [0.027] [0.025]
0.537** 0.489** 0.491** 0.407**
[0.074] [0.072] [0.087] [0.076]
0.101 0.141** 0.106 0.164**
[0.052] [0.049] [0.058] [0.054]
1.223 1.428 1.198 1.782*
[0.244] [0.279] [0.307] [0.422]
0.078 0.031 0.120* 0.091*
[0.041] [0.037] [0.048] [0.041]
1.081 1.05 1.172 1.336
[0.157] [0.150] [0.217] [0.219]
-0.063 -0.04 -0.111** -0.106**
[0.049] [0.047] [0.043] [0.038]
1.116 0.951 0.961 0.72
[0.230] [0.194] [0.254] [0.173]
0.117 1.604* 0.032 1.3 0.05 1.275 -0.046 0.868
[0.065] [0.351] [0.057] [0.311] [0.074] [0.400] [0.056] [0.283]
0.062* 1.376** 0.044 1.289* 0.083* 1.616** 0.046 1.291*
[0.029] [0.150] [0.027] [0.140] [0.033] [0.217] [0.028] [0.167]
0.066 1.273 0.049 1.175 0.049 1.347 0.034 1.179
[0.045] [0.195] [0.041] [0.195] [0.048] [0.276] [0.042] [0.242]
-0.063* 1.093 -0.037 1.061 -0.060* 1.051 -0.047 1.029
[0.025] [0.131] [0.024] [0.121] [0.027] [0.163] [0.024] [0.143]
-0.007 1.298** 0.025 1.427** 0.019 1.356** 0.033 1.410**
[0.022] [0.119] [0.021] [0.126] [0.025] [0.159] [0.023] [0.149]
-0.026 1.207 -0.028 1.075 0.035 1.385* -0.02 1.02
[0.027] [0.134] [0.025] [0.119] [0.032] [0.198] [0.027] [0.144]
0.001 0.973 -0.044 0.800* -0.019 0.896 -0.075** 0.662**
[0.027] [0.107] [0.024] [0.087] [0.029] [0.125] [0.024] [0.088]
-0.003 0.961 0.008 1.056 -0.011 0.972 0.005 1.067
[0.024] [0.097] [0.023] [0.100] [0.026] [0.125] [0.024] [0.122]
0 0.981 0.017 1.034 -0.01 0.944 0.016 1.022
[0.025] [0.099] [0.024] [0.101] [0.027] [0.122] [0.025] [0.121]
Wave of retirement dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 2697 6484 2979 7110 1958 4598 2391 5650
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Age in Years at Retirement Wave
Married or "Partnered", includes Absent Spouse
Total Wealth (in 100,000s) in 2000 $'s at time of 
Retirement




R & SP retired at R's Retirement Wave
R & SP retired in Previous Wave
Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at Previous Wave
Male & Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at 
Retirement Wave 
Male & Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at Previous 
Wave 
Spouse Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at 
Retirement Wave
Spouse Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at 
Previous Wave
Male & Spouse Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at 
Retirement Wave
Male & Spouse Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at 
Previous Wave
R Reports Being "Other Race"
R Reports Being Black
R Reports Being Hispanic
R from North Census Division
R from Midwest Census Division
Full-Sample








Rand Labor Force 
Status
R from West Census Division
R has less than High School Diploma or GED
R has Some College but No Degree
R has College Degree or More





Table 8:  Probit and Survival Analysis of Unretirement Using Demographic and Health Controls























-0.017** 1.071** -0.039** 1.082** -0.033** 1.122** -0.033** 1.100**
[0.006] [0.024] [0.004] [0.024] [0.005] [0.040] [0.004] [0.031]
-0.111* 0.522** -0.075 0.761 -0.113* 0.464* -0.096* 0.662
[0.050] [0.129] [0.046] [0.176] [0.055] [0.152] [0.048] [0.183]
-0.056 0.986 -0.053 0.954 -0.111* 0.726 -0.091* 0.851
[0.040] [0.154] [0.037] [0.151] [0.049] [0.149] [0.043] [0.162]
0.181** 2.118** 0.072 1.379 0.188* 2.838** 0.111 1.673
[0.063] [0.578] [0.055] [0.353] [0.073] [1.035] [0.060] [0.514]
-0.085** -0.057* -0.089** -0.060*
[0.024] [0.022] [0.028] [0.024]
0.487** 0.583** 0.486** 0.450**
[0.056] [0.066] [0.082] [0.070]
-0.001 1.001 0.001 1.007 -0.001 1.005 0 1.007
[0.002] [0.009] [0.001] [0.008] [0.002] [0.011] [0.002] [0.012]
-0.192** -0.147** -0.179** -0.159**
[0.028] [0.027] [0.031] [0.027]
0.429** 0.381** 0.383** 0.308**
[0.082] [0.077] [0.099] [0.080]
0.111 0.09 0.148 0.164*
[0.067] [0.059] [0.079] [0.069]
1.434 1.846* 1.397 2.413**
[0.389] [0.506] [0.508] [0.811]
0.075 0.049 0.150* 0.077
[0.050] [0.043] [0.063] [0.047]
1.195 1.081 1.619 1.406
[0.236] [0.213] [0.411] [0.322]
-0.011 -0.016 -0.105* -0.054
[0.066] [0.057] [0.052] [0.050]
1.016 0.886 0.837 0.754
[0.282] [0.265] [0.304] [0.262]
0.137 1.847* 0.095 1.714 0.09 1.741 0.102 1.815
[0.083] [0.522] [0.075] [0.549] [0.103] [0.731] [0.088] [0.725]
0.036 1.224 0.034 1.256 0.037 1.474* 0.057 1.259
[0.035] [0.178] [0.031] [0.188] [0.042] [0.269] [0.034] [0.228]
0.021 1.098 0.018 1.044 0.012 0.984 0.02 0.874
[0.056] [0.250] [0.050] [0.251] [0.062] [0.306] [0.053] [0.276]
-0.049 1.015 -0.02 0.991 -0.047 0.968 -0.027 1.063
[0.030] [0.159] [0.028] [0.153] [0.035] [0.214] [0.030] [0.201]
-0.012 1.310* 0.012 1.452** 0.027 1.443* 0.026 1.524**
[0.027] [0.159] [0.025] [0.178] [0.032] [0.239] [0.027] [0.229]
-0.025 1.163 0.018 1.055 0.055 1.342 0.03 1.045
[0.032] [0.168] [0.031] [0.155] [0.042] [0.287] [0.036] [0.205]
-0.01 0.896 0.007 0.739 -0.001 0.844 0.002 0.583**
[0.034] [0.144] [0.031] [0.126] [0.040] [0.175] [0.032] [0.122]
-0.022 0.928 -0.001 1.241 -0.023 1.015 -0.011 1.35
[0.029] [0.125] [0.026] [0.158] [0.033] [0.190] [0.028] [0.212]
-0.015 0.918 -0.012 1.07 0 0.949 -0.002 1.138
[0.028] [0.120] [0.026] [0.141] [0.034] [0.171] [0.029] [0.187]
Wave of retirement dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 1722 2929 1850 3162 1100 1864 1388 2424
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Self-reported 
Retirement Status




Rand Labor Force 
Status
Age in Years at Retirement Wave
Married or "Partnered", includes Absent Spouse
Total Wealth (in 100,000s) in 2000 $'s at time of 
Retirement
Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at Retirement 
Wave
R & SP retired at R's Retirement Wave
Married and Male
Male
R & SP retired in Previous Wave
Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at Previous Wave
Male & Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at 
Retirement Wave 
Male & Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at 
Previous Wave 
Spouse Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at 
Retirement Wave
Spouse Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at 
Previous Wave
Male & Spouse Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at 
Retirement Wave
Male & Spouse Self-rated 'Poor' or 'Fair' Health at 
Previous Wave
R Reports Being "Other Race"
R Reports Being Black
R Reports Being Hispanic
R from North Census Division
R from Midwest Census Division
Under-65 Sample
(1)  In the probit analyses, "ever unretired" is the dependent variable.  In the survival time analyses, "unretired in the current wave" is the 
dependent variable.





R from West Census Division
R has less than High School Diploma or GED
R has Some College but No Degree
R has College Degree or More
Table 9: Probit and Survival Analysis of Unretirement using Health Insurance and Pensions Controls
0.096** 0.100** 0.084** 0.131** 0.088* 0.093* 0.049 0.104**
[0.033] [0.035] [0.030] [0.033] [0.040] [0.043] [0.034] [0.038]
2.329** 2.341** 1.998** 2.242** 2.344** 2.531** 1.572** 1.878**
[0.277] [0.296] [0.235] [0.283] [0.399] [0.462] [0.257] [0.328]
0.033 0.038 0.055 0.056 0.112* 0.097 0.073 0.062
[0.039] [0.040] [0.038] [0.039] [0.051] [0.052] [0.043] [0.043]
1.053 1.091 1.044 1.014 1.377 1.306 1.205 1.12
[0.151] [0.162] [0.147] [0.148] [0.271] [0.266] [0.209] [0.200]
0.058* 0.048 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.023 0.033 0.029
[0.027] [0.028] [0.026] [0.027] [0.030] [0.031] [0.027] [0.028]
1.855** 1.800** 1.767** 1.791** 1.720** 1.796** 1.741** 1.764**
[0.204] [0.209] [0.187] [0.197] [0.244] [0.273] [0.222] [0.235]
-0.038* -0.060** -0.026 -0.046* 0.018 -0.008 -0.015 -0.037
[0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.018] [0.020] [0.021] [0.018] [0.019]
0.857* 0.780** 0.808** 0.722** 1.021 0.889 0.824* 0.709**
[0.065] [0.061] [0.059] [0.055] [0.097] [0.087] [0.072] [0.064]
Demographic, Health, and Wealth 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Wave of retirement dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 2745 2697 6446 6363 3030 2979 7054 6974 1993 1958 4586 4535 2436 2391 5620 5558
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Full-retirement Only Definition
Self-reported Retirement Status Rand Labor Force Status Self-reported Retirement Status Rand Labor Force Status
Directional Definition Directional Definition Full-retirement Only DefinitionFull-Sample
(1)  In the probit analyses, "ever unretired" is the dependent variable.  In the survival time analyses, "unretired in the current wave" is the dependent variable.
Unsubsidized Employer Provide Health 
Insurance at Retirement Wave
Unsubsidized Employer Provide Health 
Insurance in Previous Wave
R Receives Pension at Retirement 
Wave
R Receives Pension in Previous Wave
Respondent (R) Has No Health 
Insurance at Retirement Wave 
Respondent (R) Has No Health 
Insurance in Previous Wave
R Buys Private Health Insurance at 
Retirement Wave
R Buys Private Health Insurance in 
Previous Wave
Probit (1) Survival Time Probit Survival Time Probit Survival Time Probit Survival Time
Marginal Impact Hazard Ratio Marginal Impact Hazard Ratio Marginal Impact Hazard Ratio Marginal Impact Hazard Ratio
Table 10: Probit and Survival Analysis of Unretirement using Health Insurance and Pensions Controls
0.133** 0.172** 0.091* 0.116** 0.132* 0.166** 0.085* 0.109*
[0.042] [0.047] [0.037] [0.041] [0.054] [0.060] [0.042] [0.047]
1.974** 2.135** 1.967** 2.252** 2.445** 2.367** 1.993** 2.267**
[0.295] [0.347] [0.291] [0.363] [0.521] [0.616] [0.380] [0.476]
0.025 0.016 0.051 0.036 0.119 0.087 0.105 0.071
[0.046] [0.047] [0.044] [0.044] [0.064] [0.065] [0.054] [0.053]
0.94 0.935 1.066 0.986 1.435 1.266 1.326 1.206
[0.173] [0.177] [0.190] [0.182] [0.382] [0.344] [0.295] [0.274]
0.035 0.031 0.015 0.009 0 -0.006 0.001 -0.006
[0.032] [0.033] [0.029] [0.030] [0.036] [0.037] [0.032] [0.032]
1.406* 1.377* 1.431** 1.412* 1.304 1.266 1.463* 1.411*
[0.189] [0.192] [0.191] [0.193] [0.244] [0.242] [0.242] [0.241]
-0.009 -0.047* -0.01 -0.038 0.056* 0.021 0.023 -0.007
[0.023] [0.024] [0.021] [0.022] [0.027] [0.028] [0.023] [0.024]
0.88 0.758* 0.918 0.778* 1.251 1.021 1.039 0.86
[0.091] [0.082] [0.095] [0.084] [0.172] [0.150] [0.130] [0.112]
Demographic, Health, and Wealth 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Wave of retirement dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 1755 1722 2890 2851 1884 1850 3121 3083 1120 1100 1849 1826 1417 1388 2405 2373
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Full-retirement Only Definition
Self-reported Retirement Status Rand Labor Force Status Self-reported Retirement Status Rand Labor Force Status
Directional Definition Full-retirement Only Definition




(1)  In the probit analyses, "ever unretired" is the dependent variable.  In the survival time analyses, "unretired in the current wave" is the dependent variable.
Unsubsidized Employer Provide Health 
Insurance at Retirement Wave
Unsubsidized Employer Provide Health 
Insurance in Previous Wave
R Receives Pension at Retirement 
Wave
R Receives Pension in Previous Wave
Respondent (R) Has No Health 
Insurance at Retirement Wave 
Respondent (R) Has No Health 
Insurance in Previous Wave
Hazard Ratio
R Buys Private Health Insurance at 
Retirement Wave
R Buys Private Health Insurance in 
Previous Wave
Survival Time Probit Probit
Under-65 Sample
Probit (1) Survival Time Probit
Marginal Impact Hazard Ratio Marginal Impact Marginal Impact
Directional Definition
Table 11: Probit and Survival Analysis of Unretirement using Shocks, Health Insurance and Pensions Controls
0.089** 0.097** 0.084** 0.134** 0.082* 0.090* 0.049 0.106**
[0.033] [0.035] [0.030] [0.034] [0.040] [0.043] [0.034] [0.038]
2.305** 2.331** 1.981** 2.225** 2.316** 2.540** 1.556** 1.873**
[0.274] [0.294] [0.233] [0.281] [0.390] [0.457] [0.253] [0.325]
0.032 0.039 0.057 0.06 0.113* 0.099 0.073 0.064
[0.039] [0.040] [0.038] [0.039] [0.051] [0.052] [0.043] [0.043]
1.056 1.092 1.038 1.003 1.384 1.302 1.199 1.104
[0.152] [0.163] [0.146] [0.146] [0.274] [0.267] [0.208] [0.197]
0.060* 0.049 0.035 0.032 0.034 0.026 0.035 0.031
[0.028] [0.028] [0.026] [0.027] [0.030] [0.031] [0.028] [0.028]
1.861** 1.796** 1.760** 1.781** 1.735** 1.809** 1.734** 1.763**
[0.205] [0.209] [0.187] [0.197] [0.247] [0.276] [0.221] [0.236]
-0.037* -0.059** -0.022 -0.042* 0.022 -0.005 -0.011 -0.034
[0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.020] [0.021] [0.018] [0.019]
0.858* 0.780** 0.808** 0.723** 1.023 0.892 0.825* 0.709**
[0.065] [0.061] [0.059] [0.055] [0.097] [0.087] [0.072] [0.064]
0.041 0.036 0.069* 0.066* 0.063 0.054 0.059* 0.058*
[0.029] [0.030] [0.027] [0.028] [0.033] [0.033] [0.028] [0.029]
1.276* 1.257* 1.209* 1.234* 1.312* 1.305* 1.299* 1.337*
[0.124] [0.123] [0.116] [0.120] [0.166] [0.169] [0.146] [0.154]
0.03 0.009 -0.117** -0.139** 0.016 -0.02 -0.098* -0.112**
[0.050] [0.050] [0.037] [0.035] [0.053] [0.050] [0.039] [0.036]
0.921 1.071 0.754 0.921 0.98 1.143 0.722 0.896
[0.156] [0.182] [0.127] [0.157] [0.207] [0.242] [0.146] [0.184]
0.078* 0.087* 0.063* 0.083* 0.071 0.076* 0.013 0.028
[0.033] [0.034] [0.031] [0.032] [0.037] [0.038] [0.032] [0.033]
1.01 0.954 1.068 1.054 1.216 1.166 1.112 1.147
[0.121] [0.118] [0.122] [0.126] [0.178] [0.175] [0.149] [0.159]
-0.035 -0.027 -0.028 -0.014 -0.017 -0.024 -0.006 -0.001
[0.024] [0.025] [0.023] [0.024] [0.026] [0.026] [0.024] [0.024]
0.889 0.969 1.048 1.133 0.818 0.908 1.038 1.108
[0.084] [0.093] [0.091] [0.099] [0.103] [0.115] [0.107] [0.116]
Demographic, Health, and Wealth 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Wave of retirement dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 2743 2696 6441 6361 3028 2978 7049 6972 1990 1957 4581 4533 2434 2390 5615 5556
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(1) OOPM is Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses
Full-retirement Only Definition Full-retirement Only Definition
Self-reported Retirement Status Rand Labor Force Status Self-reported Retirement Status Rand Labor Force Status
Respondent (R) Has No Health 
Insurance at Retirement Wave (RW) 
Respondent (R) Has No Health 
Insurance in Previous Wave (PW)
R Buys Private Health Insurance at 
RW
R Buys Private Health Insurance in PW
Unsubsidized Employer Provide Health 
Insurance at RW
Unsubsidized Employer Provide Health 
Insurance in PW
R Receives Pension at RW
R Receives Pension in PW
Survival Time
(2)  In the probit analyses, "ever unretired" is the dependent variable.  In the survival time analyses, "unretired in the current wave" is the dependent variable.
R's Household Size increases between 
RW and the Next
R's Household Size increases before 
the PW
OOPM Expenses rise 50% & over 
$2,000 between RW and Next (1)
OOPM Expenses rise 50% & over 
$2,000 before PW
Wealth Drops over 50% & more than 
$10000 between RW and the Next
Wealth Dropped over 50% & more 
than $10000 before the PW
R's Health Declines by 2 Levels or 
more between RW and the Next
R's Health Declines by 2 Levels or 
more before the PW
Survival Time Probit Survival Time Probit
Full Sample Directional Definition Directional Definition
Marginal Impact Hazard Ratio Marginal Impact Hazard Ratio
Probit (2) Survival Time Probit
Marginal Impact Hazard Ratio Marginal Impact Hazard Ratio
Table 12: Probit and Survival Analysis of Unretirement using Shocks, Health Insurance and Pensions Controls
0.120** 0.161** 0.082* 0.108** 0.108* 0.141* 0.074 0.101*
[0.042] [0.047] [0.037] [0.041] [0.053] [0.060] [0.041] [0.046]
1.947** 2.100** 1.919** 2.197** 2.411** 2.318** 1.943** 2.218**
[0.292] [0.343] [0.286] [0.356] [0.513] [0.594] [0.371] [0.462]
0.027 0.019 0.052 0.035 0.126 0.091 0.105 0.069
[0.046] [0.047] [0.044] [0.044] [0.065] [0.065] [0.054] [0.052]
0.957 0.952 1.067 0.986 1.47 1.274 1.324 1.198
[0.176] [0.180] [0.191] [0.183] [0.391] [0.347] [0.296] [0.275]
0.034 0.028 0.015 0.01 0 -0.004 0.003 -0.002
[0.033] [0.033] [0.030] [0.030] [0.036] [0.037] [0.032] [0.032]
1.406* 1.370* 1.424** 1.392* 1.313 1.262 1.459* 1.397*
[0.190] [0.192] [0.191] [0.191] [0.246] [0.242] [0.241] [0.238]
-0.01 -0.046 -0.008 -0.037 0.063* 0.028 0.029 -0.002
[0.023] [0.024] [0.021] [0.022] [0.027] [0.028] [0.023] [0.024]
0.874 0.754** 0.913 0.775* 1.24 1.019 1.036 0.855
[0.090] [0.081] [0.095] [0.083] [0.171] [0.150] [0.129] [0.111]
0.053 0.049 0.068* 0.066* 0.083* 0.079 0.087* 0.082*
[0.035] [0.036] [0.032] [0.033] [0.042] [0.044] [0.035] [0.036]
1.284 1.319* 1.294* 1.380* 1.217 1.387 1.328 1.441*
[0.165] [0.177] [0.167] [0.182] [0.222] [0.267] [0.205] [0.226]
0.078 0.045 -0.008 -0.029 0.039 0.004 0.005 -0.017
[0.064] [0.062] [0.050] [0.048] [0.068] [0.064] [0.055] [0.051]
0.816 1.112 0.822 1.09 0.828 1.083 0.873 1.181
[0.189] [0.258] [0.182] [0.239] [0.274] [0.355] [0.224] [0.297]
0.092* 0.118** 0.080* 0.100* 0.097* 0.097 0.089* 0.097*
[0.039] [0.041] [0.037] [0.039] [0.048] [0.050] [0.042] [0.044]
0.761 0.739 1.034 1.033 1.006 0.93 1.062 1.055
[0.127] [0.128] [0.154] [0.160] [0.213] [0.216] [0.190] [0.196]
-0.032 -0.022 -0.057* -0.058* -0.023 -0.034 -0.04 -0.04
[0.029] [0.031] [0.025] [0.025] [0.034] [0.034] [0.027] [0.027]
0.851 0.906 0.935 1.033 0.725 0.849 0.886 0.993
[0.114] [0.125] [0.119] [0.133] [0.145] [0.171] [0.139] [0.158]
Demographic, Health, and Wealth 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Wave of retirement dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 1755 1722 2889 2851 1884 1850 3120 3083 1119 1099 1848 1826 1417 1388 2404 2373
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(1) OOPM is Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses
Hazard Ratio
Rand Labor Force Status
Directional Definition Directional Definition Full-retirement Only Definition Full-retirement Only Definition
Self-reported Retirement Status Rand Labor Force Status Self-reported Retirement Status
Marginal Impact Hazard Ratio
Respondent (R) Has No Health 
Insurance at Retirement Wave (RW) 
Respondent (R) Has No Health 
Insurance in Previous Wave (PW)
Under-65 Sample
Marginal Impact Hazard Ratio Marginal Impact Hazard Ratio Marginal Impact
Probit
R Buys Private Health Insurance at 
RW
R Buys Private Health Insurance in PW
Unsubsidized Employer Provide Health 
Insurance at RW
Unsubsidized Employer Provide Health 
Insurance in PW
R Receives Pension at RW
R Receives Pension in PW
Wealth Drops over 50% & more than 
$10000 between RW and the Next
Wealth Dropped over 50% & more 
than $10000 before the PW
(2)  In the probit analyses, "ever unretired" is the dependent variable.  In the survival time analyses, "unretired in the current wave" is the dependent variable.
OOPM Expenses rise 50% & over 
$2,000 between RW and Next (1)
OOPM Expenses rise 50% & over 
$2,000 before PW
R's Health Declines by 2 Levels or 
more between RW and the Next
R's Health Declines by 2 Levels or 
more before the PW
R's Household Size increases between 
RW and the Next
R's Household Size increases before 
the PW
Survival Time Probit Survival TimeProbit (2) Survival Time Probit Survival Time
Table 13: Probit and Survival Time Analysis that Includes Wave 1 Expectations for "Working in Retirement"























0.096** 1.481** 0.119** 1.724** 0.097** 1.681** 0.103** 1.880**
[0.021] [0.146] [0.019] [0.173] [0.021] [0.202] [0.019] [0.223]
0.074* 0.099** 0.068 0.074
[0.036] [0.036] [0.044] [0.040]
2.152** 2.013** 2.306** 1.717**
[0.291] [0.284] [0.451] [0.335]
0.011 0.048 0.091 0.037
[0.041] [0.042] [0.053] [0.045]
1.017 0.92 1.304 1.011
[0.162] [0.143] [0.283] [0.191]
0.05 0.036 0.02 0.049
[0.030] [0.029] [0.032] [0.031]
1.792** 1.880** 1.755** 1.900**
[0.222] [0.222] [0.290] [0.269]
-0.059** -0.037 -0.012 -0.034
[0.021] [0.020] [0.022] [0.020]
0.793** 0.737** 0.913 0.712**
[0.065] [0.060] [0.093] [0.069]
0.021 0.046 0.052 0.058
[0.031] [0.030] [0.035] [0.031]
1.16 1.151 1.227 1.251
[0.123] [0.123] [0.170] [0.157]
0.008 -0.164** -0.007 -0.137**
[0.053] [0.033] [0.053] [0.033]
1.134 0.941 1.208 0.904
[0.195] [0.175] [0.261] [0.204]
0.100** 0.089* 0.084* 0.04
[0.037] [0.035] [0.041] [0.036]
1.016 1.088 1.248 1.156
[0.128] [0.138] [0.189] [0.172]
-0.026 -0.023 -0.024 -0.017
[0.026] [0.025] [0.027] [0.026]
0.993 1.154 0.908 1.122
[0.100] [0.109] [0.122] [0.127]
Demographic, Health, and Wealth 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave of retirement dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 2440 5937 2594 6272 1806 4281 2095 5004
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(1) Asked only in 1992 Wave
(2) OOPM is Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses
Respondent Plans to do Paid Work in 
Retirement (1)
Respondent (R) Has No Health 
Insurance at Retirement Wave (RW) 
Respondent (R) Has No Health 
Insurance in Previous Wave (PW)
R Buys Private Health Insurance at RW
R Buys Private Health Insurance in PW
Unsubsidized Employer Provide Health 
Insurance at RW
Unsubsidized Employer Provide Health 
Insurance in PW
R Receives Pension at RW
R Receives Pension in PW
Wealth Drops over 50% & more than 
$10000 between RW and the Next
Wealth Dropped over 50% & more than 
$10000 before the PW
R's Health Declines by 2 Levels or more 
between RW and the Next
OOPM Expenses rise 50% & over 
$2,000 before PW
R's Health Declines by 2 Levels or more 
before the PW
R's Household Size increases between 
RW and the Next
R's Household Size increases before 
the PW
OOPM Expenses rise 50% & over 













Rand Labor Force 
Status
Directional Definition Directional Definition
Initial HRS Cohort Full-Sample
Table 14:  Probit and Survival Time Analysis that Includes Wave 1 Expectations for "Working in Retirement"























0.080** 1.355* 0.059** 1.613** 0.057* 1.418* 0.060* 1.868**
[0.025] [0.176] [0.023] [0.222] [0.028] [0.240] [0.024] [0.321]
0.147** 0.113* 0.109 0.086
[0.050] [0.046] [0.062] [0.051]
1.951** 1.832** 1.944* 1.985**
[0.349] [0.346] [0.562] [0.483]
-0.013 0.014 0.07 0.016
[0.047] [0.046] [0.066] [0.051]
0.88 0.884 1.324 1.044
[0.181] [0.176] [0.385] [0.250]
0.036 0.024 -0.004 0.022
[0.036] [0.034] [0.039] [0.036]
1.357* 1.480** 1.161 1.543*
[0.208] [0.219] [0.245] [0.274]
-0.054* -0.035 0.013 -0.005
[0.026] [0.024] [0.030] [0.026]
0.712** 0.761* 0.973 0.84
[0.082] [0.090] [0.153] [0.120]
0.025 0.039 0.072 0.071
[0.037] [0.034] [0.045] [0.038]
1.197 1.284 1.299 1.342
[0.180] [0.195] [0.284] [0.240]
0.029 -0.038 0.012 -0.022
[0.064] [0.050] [0.067] [0.054]
1.175 1.128 1.12 1.311
[0.282] [0.281] [0.388] [0.376]
0.129** 0.112* 0.099 0.119*
[0.045] [0.044] [0.055] [0.050]
0.805 1.153 1.037 1.205
[0.143] [0.189] [0.250] [0.236]
-0.023 -0.067* -0.044 -0.051
[0.032] [0.027] [0.035] [0.029]
0.963 1.077 0.846 0.995
[0.140] [0.150] [0.185] [0.175]
Demographic, Health, and Wealth 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave of retirement dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 1509 2558 1569 2678 984 1674 1182 2074
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(1) Asked only in 1992 Wave
(2) OOPM is Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses
Self-reported 
Retirement Status




Rand Labor Force 
Status
Respondent Plans to do Paid Work in 
Retirement (1)
Respondent (R) Has No Health 
Insurance at Retirement Wave (RW) 
Respondent (R) Has No Health 
Insurance in Previous Wave (PW)
R Buys Private Health Insurance at RW
R Buys Private Health Insurance in PW
Unsubsidized Employer Provide Health 
Insurance at RW
Unsubsidized Employer Provide Health 
Insurance in PW
R Receives Pension at RW
OOPM Expenses rise 50% & over 
$2,000 between RW and Next (2)
R Receives Pension in PW
Wealth Drops over 50% & more than 
$10000 between RW and the Next
Wealth Dropped over 50% & more than 
$10000 before the PW
R's Health Declines by 2 Levels or more 






(3)  In the probit analyses, "ever unretired" is the dependent variable.  In the survival time analyses, "unretired in the current wave" is the 
dependent variable.
Initial HRS Cohort Under-65 
Sample
Directional Definition
OOPM Expenses rise 50% & over 
$2,000 before PW
R's Health Declines by 2 Levels or more 
before the PW
R's Household Size increases between 
RW and the Next
R's Household Size increases before 
the PW
